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DISCUSSION
GRAY:

This discussion has been very interesting, but it seems to beg
the larger question of how we got into the crisis. I agree that the
deposit insurance increase of the so-called midnight raid of March
1980 was not the sole causative factor, and there are some other
questions which remain unanswered. Is there something in the tax
code affecting banks, real estate, and these bankruptcies? After all,
the First American Bank collapse here in Washington, D.C., involving BCCI, was certainly hovering in the background. What someone surely should have known sooner is that the bank was in terrible
shape because of real estate. Is there something in the tax code or
in other parts of our law that geared so much lending toward real
estate? We do not seem to have quite the same number of
problems, oddly enough, in our old rust-belt industrial sector.
EASTERBROOK:

don't see any clean link between capital gains taxation and
others. Taxing rules for banks are so different from the rules for
other institutions that it is very hard to translate from capital gains
taxation at the shareholder level to the behavior of banks.
I

GRAY:

I was asking the question in the larger sense: if an entrepreneur
has a choice between debt and equity, what leads him to borrow
rather than go to the market for equity capital? I am not talking
about how banks are taxed, but about how the person receiving the
debt or the equity is taxed.
EASTERBROOK:

Tax considerations play an enormously important role, if you're
an entrepreneur deciding whether and what kinds of claims to write.
Banks have somewhat different incentives. Let me reiterate a point
that I made in my talk. In the United States, which imposes severe
limitations on the kinds of instruments banks can accept in exchange for money, banks have an incentive, entirely apart from the
tax system, to persuade firms to issue debt, because banks can't accept equity. If you go to a bank in Germany or Japan, the bank, in
exchange for putting up a large sum of money, can accept claims
that are in part debt paper and in part equity paper. Banks have an
incentive to write whatever set of claims is most conducive to the
survival of the business, for the banks want to get paid. They want
to get money out. A bank in the United States, by contrast, always
1105
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attempts to persuade the firm to write debt. The banker will be
thrown in jail if he accepts equity in exchange for money. And that,
I think, is one of the problems with U.S. bank regulation. I don't
want to comment on any pending proposals for changes in legislation, but the shortage of diversification, and the way in which banks
in the United States are much narrower than banks in other industrialized nations, is an important ingredient in understanding why the
failure rate is higher here than elsewhere.
WEINSTEIN:

May I comment on the tax issue? There are several tax code
provisions that we might point to and ask if they really have been
beneficial to banking. I think Boyden Gray is right in suggesting
that some of them played a role in what has happened in the thrift
business. Real estate, of course, is the major investment for thrifts
and over the '80s it became an increasingly important investment
vehicle for commercial banks in various parts of the country. In the
early '80s and to a lesser extent before then, the tax code was structured in a way that substantially favored investments in real estate.
And there was, among other things, a considerable opportunity to
transmute ordinary income into capital gains through investment in
real estate. That plainly had a large influence on the tremendous
amount of lending and other investment activity in real estate, both
commercial and residential, during the 1980s. Then in 1986, Congress abruptly changed the rules, while many projects were in midstream, after many investments had been made, and many loans had
been granted, in reliance on the prior rules. The first changes were
not innocent of involvement in the extensive financing that thrifts
and banks gave to real estate during the early to mid-80s, and the
last change was hardly innocent of involvement in the collapse of
many thrifts that were heavily involved in commercial real estate
projects at the time.
The differing tax treatment of dividends and interest is also of
significance. Corporations in certain circumstances will favor debt
because the interest on servicing of that debt is deductible and dividends on equity are not. So of course this tax rule does deter some
forms of equity investment. In banking it is important to the public
and depositors, with or without insurance, to have a good equity
base.
There is another tax rule that affects thrifts and it is known best
to those whom I would call the "techies" in the business. It's called
the QTL rule, the qualified thrift lender rule. And just to make
things particularly complicated, there is one version of it in the
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banking laws' and another version of it in the tax laws 2 and they may
not always reach the same result. But the end result in the tax code
is that thrifts over the years build up deductions if they have a certain percentage of their portfolio in residential real estate and similar investments that are defined in the law. They build up these
deductions as reserves against which losses are thereafter offset.
One result is excessive regulatory and tax code constraints on depository institutions in moving back and forth between different
charters or different lines of business. There are a lot of very technical but important differences in what you can do, that depend on
whether you are a thrift or commercial bank or a savings bank. And
it can depend on whether you've got a federal charter or one of the
fifty-two or -three state and territorial charters that are available.
But once you are a thrift and you build up this QTL reserve, there is
a tremendous tax cost in its recapture if you seek to change your
charter and way of doing business and then fail to qualify under the
Tax Code QTL provision. So we have some of these more obscure
and hidden costs that impair movements in the business that might
be rationally responsive to changes in the business climate.
EASTERBRooK:

I trust you don't get any extra supervisory goodwill as a result
of building these things up.
WEINS'EIN:
True.
GRAY:
Are there any questions from the audience?
QUESTION:

This is a general question directed to all the panelists. You
have not touched on consumer bankruptcy, which, to some extent,
may be the link missing between the two sides of the table. It may
also cast some doubt on Professor Warren's assertion that the Bankruptcy Code does not operate to socialize risks. We have now
reached a point where there are approximately one million consumer bankruptcies a year, and the number is rising. The debt discharged in consumer bankruptcy is almost entirely credit card debt,
and credit card debt today is held mainly by eight or ten major
American banks, for which it is the most profitable part of their business. Interest rates on credit card debt have been unregulated since
the Marquette decision in 1978. 3 The result has been that banks issuI Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
No. 101-73.
2 I.R.C. § 7701(a)(19) (1986).
3 Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978).
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ing credit cards have been able to convert their losses by raising
interest rates. The prime rate fell from 19% in 1981 to 8% in 1986;
during that period, bank card rates remained stable. During the two
year period beginning in April of 1989, the prime rate fell by onethird and bank card rates actually rose, which suggests that the assumption that there is effective competition with respect to bank
card rates is misplaced. I wonder, if this process continues, whether
several of our banks will be in a position where substantial socialization of risk .will be needed to protect the integrity of the banking
system. Is what we have here a cocktail composed of Congressional
Democrats resistant to tightening consumer bankruptcy exemptions
and the Administration or its agencies resistant to the reimposition
of a floating usury rate on credit card transactions?
WARREN:

No. Your data are right. Citibank lost $150,000,000 last year
on all of its operations other than credit card operations, and made
$600,000,000 on its credit card operations. 4 It is nice to know that
the last time you used your Visa card you subsidized those bad LBO
loans and bad debts to Argentina.
But I do not draw the inference that we are talking about some
kind of socialization of risk. I think we are watching the same thing
happen on the consumer side that we watched happen on the business side. Banks have rising losses in consumer bankruptcy, but
what have they done every single year? They have put out as many
more cards as they could. Why? Because it is profitable to take
those credit card losses. That is what the statistics show them: go
ahead, because although one out of a hundred debtors cannot pay,
99 are paying off at 21% interest. And when the spread between the
wholesale and retail cost of money is from 6% to 21%, business is
profitable--even the highest risk business.
What troubles me is the suggestion that the answer is to tighten
the consumer bankruptcy laws that give those debtors relief.
Clamping down on consumer debtors will yield very little. The
problem in consumer bankruptcy is that the people who file cannot
pay their debts. You can rip out their fingernails, you can sweat
them, you can tell them they cannot have any kind of discharge in
bankruptcy, but the reality is that they cannot pay. For the banks to
describe these losses as bankruptcy losses is a littlejoke. The credit
card companies have plain, old fashioned, bad debt losses. When
you give a ninth credit card to somebody who makes $16,000 a year,
two things are likely to happen. First, you run a real risk that when
4

Michael Quint, Banks Raise Scrutiny of Credit Cards, N.Y. TIMES, Sec. 1, at 33 (May

27, 1991).
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the holder makes charges on it, he is not going to pay you back at
the other end. Second, enough people will pay back at 21% interest
for you to make a profit on it. That is exactly what is going on now.
The connection you make between bank failures and dependence on high-interest credit cards is a fair one. But surely you are
not suggesting that the way to save the banks is on the backs of unsophisticated, high-risk consumer borrowers. In effect, the banks
are currently trying to make up their losses from real estate lending,
leveraged buyouts, foreign loans and the like, by expanding their
super-profitable credit card business. And if the credit card business is not so profitable as the debtors become riskier, should we
squeeze the debtors harder? I do not think so. The answer is not to
cut consumer protection. It is to demand better lending activity
generally.
JONES:
What I would point out in response to that is yes, you can feel
sorry for the debtor who is unable to pay his or her credit card debt,
but if there were no bankruptcy discharge at all, we would all think
much more closely before borrowing the money.
WARREN:

I am not sure that that is empirically true. Most of the people
who do not pay their credit card debts do not go into bankruptcy.
They just do not pay them. They move. They change names. They
juggle and shuffle. There are a lot of responses to debt. Knocking
over a convenience store is a response to debt. It is not the case that
if you cannot get a discharge in bankruptcy you will somehow become a rich or a responsible person. The credit card companies
know this. They do actuarial lending-high profit actuarial lending.
QUFSrON:

I would like to address this question to judge Easterbrook. You
talked about greater diversification of loan maturities. I would like
to address a different type of diversification-that is, geographical
diversification. Many states will not allow banks to operate outside
of their boundaries; if the laws would encourage nationwide banks,
so that you could have a bank extending from Washington, D.C. to
Texas while the Texas real estate economy is in the doldrums and
D.C. is booming, wouldn't the banks have a better chance of riding
it out?
EASTERBROOK:

My comments about diversification were not principally directed to diversification across durations. They were directed to diversification across the entire spectrum of investments. You want
the institution to have investments whose returns are subject to dif-
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ferent risks at different times. Part of the problem in the banking
system has been caused by the lack of geographic or industry diversification. If some banks are specialized in oil and something happens there, those banks go belly-up. Specialization in markets is
beneficial. A bank making loans for oil exploration and drilling
needs people who are real specialists, who know how to evaluate
those risks. Concentration promotes such specialization and expertise. If you have somebody making the loan decisions who does not
know much about the oil industry, you can get some really loony
decisions. Unfortunately specialization of this kind, although it
makes each loan individually more sensible, leaves the bank with a
boom-or-bust portfolio. Given the business cycle, a bust eventually
arrives. That is why I stressed the benefits of increasing the diversification over time, over industry, over geography, over type of investment, and so on.
QUESTION:
I was wondering if any of the panelists would like to comment
on the increasing rise of lender liability suits, how that has affected
the decline of nonbankruptcy work-outs, and whether some lenders
seek the shelter of the Bankruptcy Code to avoid these suits.
JONES:
It is not at all clear to me that lender liability suits have encouraged the precipitous filing of bankruptcy petitions, because in
most cases it is the choice of the debtor whether to go into Chapter
11. Also, I believe the lender can be as equally vulnerable to a
charge of lender liability for what he does in Chapter 11 as for what
he might have done outside, once the stay is lifted, for instance.
What I can assure you is that the threat of lender liability lawsuits
has had a tremendous and hugely unfavorable impact on the banking industry. Every lender is looking at this debtor and thinking,
what have I not got in my documents, or worse yet, what have I got
in my documents that you are going to say is a violation of good
faith and use to sue me for punitive damages. It has made a very
difficult relationship.
WARREN:
One consequence, I think, of an increased fear of lender liability suits is to change the leverage somewhat between debtor and
creditor. The consequences show up both outside Chapter 11, in
negotiations, and inside Chapter 11, because the lawsuits that the
debtor has against anyone else are property of the estate. Some
Chapter 11 attorneys are beginning to perceive that a lender liability
suit may be the very best way to refinance a Chapter 11 and reorganize a business. So it has certainly changed this balance.
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EASTERBROOK:

I have a five-word comment. Not in the Seventh Circuit.
QUESTION:

I have a question for Judge Jones, whose comments were a
breath of fresh air compared to what I often hear at commercial law
league meetings. You mentioned in particular that a lot of Chapter
1 Is are filed by single asset real estate concerns. Do you think that
there should be more aggressive use of the doctrine of bad faith
filing, under which the court can simply dismiss the bankruptcy case,
and the secured creditor can go ahead rather than going through
the whole procedure of obtaining relief from the stay?
JONES:

As you probably know, I wrote a case on bad faith filings, 5 and I
heard that when it came out it caused a boomlet of excitement
among lending attorneys in the Fifth Circuit. Then one of my former law firm partners appeared before a bankruptcy judge in Austin
and moved to dismiss a single asset case, saying that it was in bad
faith. The judge's comment was, "I do not believe in that. Next
point." What is so annoying about bankruptcy is that there is a set
of procedural rules that ought to be but are not normally followed.
A creditor ought to be able to move to lift the stay and to get a
hearing and a result within thirty days. That almost never happens.
A debtor has 120 days to file a plan of reorganization; the last time I
read some of the commentary in Congress in 1978, it was clear that
they really thought this would happen-that debtors would get
about 120 days. And if they could not come up with something, the
case would not go on. If those time limits were simply rigorously
imposed, you would not have to worry about things like good faith.
I do believe there is an underlying concept of good faith in filing a
Chapter 11, in accordance with which the idea of reorganization is
simply antithetical to a single creditor-single debtor context. Every
bankruptcy judge you talk to will tell you, "Oh yes, we throw out
those cases as fast as we can." I do not see it happening. It is not
true.
QUiSHON:
I would like to direct this question to Mr. Weinstein. In the
course of the last six months, I have been catching a glimpse in the
paper about various banking reform packages. I wonder if you
could clarify this for me, particularly the talk about banks going into
insurance, insurance companies going into banking, taking down
the wall between capital investments that was put up in the '30s,
5 Little Creek Dev. Co. v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 779 F.2d 1068 (5th
Cir. 1986).
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banks involved in that and the development of national interstate
banking.
WEINSTEIN:

There is pending an administration proposal that is wending its
way through committees in both the House and Senate side that
would make a variety of changes in the banking business as opposed
to the thrift business. As I indicated before, some regulatory
changes would be more strenuous in requiring closure or other action for banks whose capital or soundness fell below specified levels.
Subject to a variety of detailed conditions and questions of timing,
the present barriers on interstate branching would be eliminated.
Thrifts can now branch interstate subject to our agency's approval.
Banks, as indicated before, are subject to a crazy quilt pattern of
regulation that the states largely control, and this legislation would,
among other things, eliminate that. The legislation would also permit banks to be held by what would be called financial services holding companies. These companies could diversify broadly within the
financial services industry but not with insured funds, so that the
insured banking subsidiaries would be fenced off behind so-called
firewalls. But the enterprise as a whole could, for example, invest in
equities that are now forbidden, engage in investment banking
which, to some extent, also is forbidden, or undertake other activities that are now forbidden. The legislation would permit a bank to
be part of a broadly diversified financial services enterprise and also
allow banks to be owned by industrial companies as thrifts can be
now. We have about thirty or forty thrifts that are owned by companies like Ford and ITT, to give you two prominent examples. Banks
now cannot be affiliated with industrial companies. This legislation
proposes to permit that. There are varying degrees of controversy
attached to each segment of the proposal. I think the most controversy lies in the so-called banking and commerce issue-that is the
ownership of banks by industrial companies-and on the extension
of powers into securities, insurance, and other diversified
businesses.
EASTERBROOK:

I said I wasn't going to comment on pending legislation and I'm
not. Still, we should understand when we talk about socialization of
risk that we are talking about government, about law. New legal
standards can make it in private persons' interests to internalize
risks. Without saying anything about the particular bills that have
been proposed by particular persons, one logical response to legislation of the kind that Mr. Weinstein is describing-diversification
plus a firewall-is that such rules make it advantageous for the bank
itself to segregate the insured deposit business and hold liquid as-
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sets underlying the insured business so as to have a larger uninsured
deposit business, and other borrowing and lending that is less heavily regulated. That simultaneously increases the diversification of
the banks' total portfolios and diminishes the risk that risk will be
socialized because there is a greater likelihood that hard assets will
support the insured side of the banking business. This sort of law,
by authorizing modified broad banks, gives people incentives to create narrow banks too.
QUFSnON:
This is a question for the banking side of the panel. Perhaps
either of you would comment on the kinds of takings cases that are
being brought now pursuant to changes in the accounting rules of
the kind Mr. Weinstein spoke about. As I understand the scenario,
in the mid-80s the regulators invited solvent banks to take on the
portfolios of insolvent banks, and the accounting rules permitted
goodwill as well as marked-to-cost rather than marked-to-market accounting. Those rules have subsequently been changed, and the
theory is that making this change in the middle of the game amounts
to a taking.
WEINSTEIN:

I should fear to tread but I will not. Certainly we contend in
our papers and the two dozen or so pending cases that the takings
argument is frivolous. While the canons of ethics are supposed to
preclude me from giving testimony as to my personal beliefs, I will
tell you about a series of cases in which I was involved as a private
lawyer. We made substantially similar takings arguments and, not
much to my surprise, I and others making those arguments uniformly lost. In the early '80s, Congress enacted a statute called the
Multi-Employer Pension Amendments Act of 1980.6 It imposed on
pre-existing pension plans, covering a variety of unions, so-called
multi-employer pension plans, very substantial liabilities that were
far greater-and I mean tens of millions of dollars in some casesthan those that had been contracted for in the collective bargaining
process. All of us who were representing employers that were hit
with those bills in the early days of litigation over the statute made
takings arguments. We lost each and every time, at least when the
issue reached an appellate court.
QUETION:
Just a quick question for the right side of the panel. Is the social stigma against bankruptcy now largely gone?
JONES:
6

Pub. L. No. 96-364.
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I think it is. A prominent Houston bankruptcy attorney said
that bankruptcy is the financing law of the '80s, and I think he meant
exactly what he said. I think most businessmen, since many businesses have a large self-interested management component, know
they can stay on in Chapter 11, even though they could not pay their
debts and are unlikely to survive in a liquidation. Thus, there are
big incentives to file in Chapter 11.
WARREN:
Let me give an alternative view, just on the business side of the
house. Managers who think they are going to go into bankruptcy
and survive are stupid. Of the managers of publicly traded companies who went into bankruptcy in the last decade, 52% were re7
placed within the first year and 66% by the end of the second year.
In a follow-up study, researchers found that not one of those managers was rehired by a publicly traded company.8 In fact, most of
them are still unemployed. Of the 198 managers who were studied
in this group, two committed suicide. I think the perception that a
manager lightly says, "How about a little bankruptcy" is just wrong.
Managers consider bankruptcy when the alternative is death today.
That is why we see so many dead cases going into bankruptcy. The
notion that there is no penalty imposed on the individuals who make
the decision to go into bankruptcy is just not true.
GRAY:
I am going to exercise the prerogatives of the chair and thank
the panel and the audience. It has been very interesting for me.

7 Stuart Gilson, Management Turnover and FinancialDistress, 25J. FIN. ECON. (1989),
cited in S. Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Ruin: Bankruptcy and Investment Choice, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 278 n.3, n.46 (1991).
8 Id.

